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Abstract
Historically, dehumanization has enabled members of advantaged groups to ‘morally disen-
gage’ from disadvantaged group suffering, thereby facilitating acts of intergroup aggression
such as colonization, slavery and genocide. But is blatant dehumanization exclusive to
those at the top ‘looking down’, or might disadvantaged groups similarly dehumanize those
who dominate them? We examined this question in the context of intergroup warfare in
which the disadvantaged group shoulders a disproportionate share of casualties and may
be especially likely to question the humanity of the advantaged group. Specifically, we
assessed blatant dehumanization in the context of stark asymmetric conflict between Israe-
lis (Study 1; N = 521) and Palestinians (Study 2; N = 354) during the 2014 Gaza war. We
observed that (a) community samples of Israelis and Palestinians expressed extreme (and
comparable) levels of blatant dehumanization, (b) blatant dehumanization was uniquely
associated with outcomes related to outgroup hostility for both groups, even after account-
ing for political ideologies known to strongly predict outgroup aggression, and (c) the
strength of association between blatant dehumanization and outcomes was similar across
both groups. This study illuminates the striking potency and symmetry of blatant dehumani-
zation among those on both sides of an active asymmetric conflict.
Introduction
“Wars begin in the minds of men.”–United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) constitution preamble
Humans have in place strong moral prohibitions and psychological restraints against harming
others. At the same time, history illustrates that humans have a remarkable propensity to com-
mit extreme violence, particularly across group boundaries [1]. Writing in the shadow of
World War II and the Holocaust, many psychologists suggested that the horrors committed by
the Nazis against Jews, the Roma and others was enabled by the perception of these groups as
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‘sub-human’, which led to ‘moral disengagement’ from their suffering (e.g., [2], [3]). And long
before the Nazi regime, dehumanization was regularly employed by European powers as they
colonized, enslaved and exterminated other groups. For example, during the colonization of
Ireland by the English starting in the 17th Century, the Irish were regularly depicted in newspa-
pers as culturally inferior, irrational and prone to violence, a dehumanizing stereotype that
was popularized through the ‘Irish Joke’ [4]. Similarly, Aborigines, Native Americans and Afri-
cans were depicted as infantile savages, to be variously disposed of, enslaved or adopted as the
“White man’s burden” [5].
The contexts of genocide, colonization and slavery provide us with examples of dehumani-
zation applied down the power gradient, by those in power against the conquered masses. But
is dehumanization a psychological weapon exclusively wielded by the ‘oppressor’? As proof of
principle, we sought here to identify a context in which overt dehumanization might be dem-
onstrated to occur bi-directionally up and down the power gradient: in the midst of an active
(i.e., ‘hot’) and violent asymmetric conflict.
Although empirical work over the past two decades has focused primarily on subtle forms
of dehumanization (e.g., infrahumanization; [6]), recent work has shifted to (re-)examining
more blatant incarnations [7], [8], [9]. For example, [10] developed a measure based on the
popular ‘Ascent of Man’ diagram, which was specifically designed to capture blatant dehuman-
ization by assessing how ‘evolved and civilized’ people considered other groups to be. This
work showed that blatant dehumanization is strongly and uniquely associated with the types
of highly aggressive attitudes that are particularly relevant to violent conflict, such as support
for torture and militaristic forms of counter-terrorism. However, the research focused exclu-
sively on the perceptions of advantaged groups (Americans, British people, Hungarians) with
respect to disadvantaged groups (e.g., Arabs, Muslims, the Roma). Here, we sought to apply
this measure to both sides of an active conflict: Israelis and Palestinians during the 2014 War
in Gaza.
By examining the level and potency of blatant dehumanization down the power gradient
during active conflict (from empowered Israelis towards disempowered Palestinians), we
examine dehumanization during one of the contexts which originally inspired theoretical
work on dehumanization. However, the primary goal of this research was to examine blatant
dehumanization in the opposite direction: from disempowered Palestinians towards empow-
ered Israelis. Although much recent research suggests that dehumanization down the power
gradient is likely to be strong and potent in this context, there are arguments supporting com-
peting predictions about dehumanization in the opposite direction.
On the one hand, hierarchical models of intergroup relations provide evidence that social
hierarchies are often endorsed by both disadvantaged and advantaged groups. For example,
there is often a surprising level of consensus among members of advantaged and disadvan-
taged groups in their endorsement of ‘hierarchy enhancing legitimizing myths’, such as the
belief in meritocracy or the protestant work ethic [11]. Other work further suggests that indi-
viduals, including those belonging to disadvantaged groups, in fact have a motivation to justify
the social system because of a desire for order and predictability [12]. Consistent with this, dis-
advantaged groups sometimes display implicit bias against their own group [13], [14]. It is also
the case that high-status individuals and groups tend to be stereotyped as highly competent,
possessing traits such as being capable, intelligent, and sophisticated (e.g., [15]) that are associ-
ated with full humanness (e.g., [16]). From these perspectives, one might predict that disad-
vantaged groups like Palestinians might show a lower tendency to dehumanize an advantaged
outgroup like Israelis than the reverse, or even that they might rate the outgroup as equally
human or more human than the ingroup.
Symmetric dehumanization during asymmetric warfare
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However, the degree to which disadvantaged or disempowered groups favor advantaged
groups and legitimize a system of oppression is likely to be limited by a range of factors—we
suggest that one of those factors could be the perceived brutality of the other group. Although
factors such as the massive disparity in economic development, military might and scientific
achievement between Israel and Palestine might lead some Palestinians to support the view
that Israelis are more ‘advanced’ or ‘sophisticated’ than Palestinians, the history of violent con-
flict between the two groups should also lead Palestinians to perceive Israelis as highly ‘savage’,
‘aggressive’ and ‘cold-hearted’—perceptions that are strongly associated with Ascent dehu-
manization ([10], Study 5). As the 2014 Gaza war unfolded and ingroup casualties mounted,
such perceptions are likely to have been particularly salient, making this an ideal context in
which blatant dehumanization up the power gradient might emerge (see also [17]). This view
is also in line with social identity approaches to intergroup relations, which suggest that indi-
viduals generally favor their own groups over outgroups across a range of evaluations and
behaviors, a pattern that can escalate to outgroup derogation under conditions of conflict [18].
From this perspective, disadvantaged groups may be predicted to dehumanize advantaged
groups, particularly those with whom intergroup conflict is salient.
In the current research, we predicted that the active conflictual relationship between Israelis
and Palestinians would overcome any tendency to humanize the advantaged outgroup, result-
ing in high levels of blatant dehumanization among disempowered Palestinians towards
empowered Israelis, potentially comparable to those we expected among Israelis towards
Palestinians. We further expected that blatant dehumanization by the disempowered group
towards the empowered group would be uniquely predictive of conflict-relevant outcomes,
just as blatant dehumanization by empowered groups predict such outcomes. Confirmation of
these predictions would serve as a strong proof-of-principle that blatant dehumanization can
occur and function similarly both up and down a power gradient during asymmetric conflict.
We examined these questions by exploring the prevalence and consequences of blatant
dehumanization within community samples of Israelis and Palestinians that were broadly
comparable in terms of gender, education and conservatism. In these populations, we assess
both mean levels of blatant outgroup dehumanization, as well as the unique relationship
between blatant dehumanization and support for conflict relevant behaviors, beyond ideologi-
cal variables (i.e., conservatism and social dominance orientation) known to strongly drive
these attitudes [19], [20], [21], [22].
Although the focus of this research is on dehumanization up the power gradient, we also
extend prior work by engaging in a comparative analysis that directly examines the role of
group status and power on blatant dehumanization. Previous work suggests that feelings of
power are associated with subtle dehumanization [23], however the effect of actual or per-
ceived power on blatant dehumanization has not been examined. In the current study we
investigate the role of group power on blatant dehumanization in two related ways. First, we
examine the role of group position: Wherever we have the same outcome measures among
both groups, we determine whether the predictive utility of blatant dehumanization is statisti-
cally moderated by membership in the advantaged versus disadvantaged group. Second,
beyond group membership, we examine the role of individual-level variation in the subjective
sense of group power that individuals report. Specifically, among our samples of Israelis and
Palestinians, we determine whether feeling more or less powerful influences (a) levels of blatant
outgroup dehumanization and (b) the association between blatant dehumanization and out-
come measures. We investigate these important questions in a unique and important context
(the 2014 Gaza war), when dehumanization and aggression were highly relevant.
Symmetric dehumanization during asymmetric warfare
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181422 July 26, 2017 3 / 20
Study 1
Method
Research was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology.
Participants. We aimed to collect data from as large a sample as was feasible. The first
author collected data online from 521 Israeli participants in early August 2014 (i.e., during the
War in Gaza; M age = 39.65; SD = 12.74; 51.2% male), using the Midgam panel service (see
also [17]). The survey was open to participants from any region of Israel. The political orienta-
tion of the sample was heterogeneous, though it leaned somewhat conservative with 57.6% of
respondents reporting that they were slightly, strongly or extremely right (see Table 1 for
descriptive details). The sample was generally well educated, with 67.3% completing college or
professional school. Participants completed an omnibus survey (in Hebrew) of their political
and social attitudes. We discuss below the variables relating centrally to the current research
on blatant dehumanization (see supplementary materials for complete survey).
Measures. Unless otherwise noted, all measures were converted from the scales reported
below to a 0–100 scale, for ease of comparison with the results of Study 2.
Age and gender. Participants reported their age and gender (1 = male; 2 = female).
Education. Participants indicated their education by selecting one of 14 options, which
were broken into five major categories reflecting whether participants had: 1 = Completed
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and variable intercorrelations for Study 1.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Perceived Group
Power
-
2. Social Dominance
Orientation
.11* -
3. Conservatism .01 .37*** -
4. Blatant
Dehumanization
.14** .33*** .35*** -
5. Hope .05 -.36*** -.55*** -.34*** -
6. Hostile Emotions .05 .33*** .50*** .47*** -.45*** -
7. Group-Based
Guilt
-.07 -.28*** -.51*** -.29*** .35*** -.34*** -
8. Willingness to
Negotiate
-.02 -.26*** -.55*** -.33*** .52*** -.35*** .36*** -
9. Concession
Making
-.04 -.31*** -.61*** -.41*** .56*** -.47*** .52*** .60*** -
10. Collective
Aggression
.03 .44*** .58*** .46*** -.54*** .56*** -.48*** -.50*** -.59*** -
11. Acceptance of
Civilian Casualties
.02 .27*** .34*** .26*** -.32*** .36*** -.35*** -.31*** -.40*** .51***
-
M 83.99 40.74 62.67 39.81 46.89 57.54 16.44 40.90 31.89 55.82 575.08
SD 24.27 18.59 20.18 35.01 28.16 23.39 23.76 27.70 25.96 21.00 456.49
Quartiles 66.67,
100, 100
28.57,
40.48,
52.38
50.00,
66.67,
83.33
5.00,
40.00,
69.00
25.00,
50.00,
70.83
38.89,
55.55,
72.22
0.00,
0.00,
25.00
16.67,
41.67,
58.33
8.33,
29.17,
50.00
41.67,
54.17,
70.31
26.00,
990.00,
1000.00
*** p < .001
** p < .01
* p < .05
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181422.t001
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primary education; 2 = Begun or completed secondary education; 3 = Completed some college
or professional higher education; 4 = Completed College or professional school; 5 = Begun or
completed graduate school.
Social dominance orientation. SDO was assessed using 8 items from the dominance sub-
dimension of the SDO-7 scale [24], which relates most strongly to the types of aggressive atti-
tudes we were interested in exploring in this work. Responses were given on Likert scales
anchored at 1 (‘Strongly Disagree’) and 7 (‘Strongly Agree’). Removing one item (“An ideal
society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom”) improved scale
reliability; the remaining seven items formed a reliable scale (α = .73).
Conservatism. Participants indicated their political ideology on a 7-point scale, anchored
at 1 (‘Extreme right’) and 7 (‘Extreme left’); we reverse-scored participants’ responses such that
higher scores indicate more conservative attitudes.
Perceived group power. We assessed subjective perceptions of group power by asking par-
ticipants to respond to the following item: “In general, when you think about power relations
between Israel and the Palestinians, which side do you think has more power?” Responses were
provided on a 1 (‘Definitely Palestinians’) to 7 (‘Definitely Israel’) scale. We also assessed percep-
tions of power on a broader array of specific dimensions (e.g., with respect to military power,
economic power, and public sympathy). We focused our assessment on the item noted above
because it intentionally captures a global assessment of group power, but results using a compos-
ite of the specific items mentioned here provided similar conclusions.
Blatant dehumanization. We assessed blatant dehumanization of Palestinians using the
Ascent scale of dehumanization [10]. Participants were shown the ‘Ascent of Man’ image, and
asked to rate on this scale how ‘evolved and civilized’ they perceived the average member of
each of the following groups to be: Europeans, Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims, Israelis, Residents
of Gaza, Members of Hamas, Americans, and Arab-Israelis. Responses were provided on a
scale marked only at its anchors of 0 (‘left side of the above image’) and 100 (‘right side of the
above image’). The left side of the image corresponded to a quadrupedal ancestor of modern
humans, and the right side of the image to a modern human. As in previous work [10], we
computed dehumanization scores by subtracting Palestinian (i.e., outgroup) humanity ratings
from Israeli (i.e., ingroup) humanity ratings, such that higher scores indicate greater outgroup
dehumanization (conclusions were similar when using absolute outgroup ratings). Our central
interest in this work was examining blatant dehumanization, and thus, we focus on this con-
struct. We also had a measure of secondary emotion attributions towards Palestinians. Con-
trolling for this variable produced broadly similar results. For mean dehumanization
responses across all target groups, see S1 Table.
Emotional hostility. Previous research has shown that blatant dehumanization is associ-
ated with hostile emotions towards the outgroup [10]. We assessed emotional hostility by asking
participants to rate the extent to which they felt the following emotions towards Palestinians:
hatred, hostility, and anger (α = .70). Responses were made on Likert scales anchored at 1 (‘Not
at all’) and 7 (‘Very much so’).
Group-based guilt. We assessed group-based guilt by asking participants to rate the
extent to which they felt “guilt regarding Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians”, and “Shame
regarding Israel’s behavior towards the Palestinians”. We reasoned that individuals who dehu-
manized Palestinians would be less likely to feel guilty about the ingroup’s actions towards
them, consistent with theorizing on moral disengagement as a consequence of dehumaniza-
tion [2]. Responses were made on Likert scale anchored at 1 (‘Not at all’) and 7 (‘Very much
so’) (r = .77, p< .001).
Hope. We assessed hope as a potential outcome of dehumanization, given recent research
describing its central role in conflict resolution [25]. We reasoned that individuals who
Symmetric dehumanization during asymmetric warfare
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dehumanized the outgroup may be more likely to see negative outgroup attributes as fixed and
thus be less likely to be hopeful about the likelihood of achieving peace. Hope was assessed
with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict using four items adapted from [25]. Sample
item: “I have hope regarding the peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”. Partici-
pants indicated their responses (α = .84) on Likert scales anchored at 1 (‘Strongly Disagree’)
and 7 (‘Strongly Agree’).
Willingness to negotiate. We reasoned that individuals who dehumanized another group
would be more likely to take extreme positions and less open to engage the outgroup in the
give-and-take often required of negotiations. We assessed willingness to negotiate with Palesti-
nians using two items adapted from [26]: “How willing would you be for Israel to negotiate
with a Palestinian side led by Mahmoud Abbas?” and “How willing would you be for Israel to
enter direct negotiations involving Hamas in order to reach a final settlement?” Participants
provided responses on Likert scales anchored at 1 (‘Not at all’) and 7 (‘Very much so’) (r = .47,
p< .001).
Concession making. Previous research suggests that dehumanization may be associated
with a lack of willingness to make concessions [27]. We examined willingness to make conces-
sions in order to reach a final resolution with the Palestinians using a four-item scale adapted
from [28]. These items included ratings of support for joint sovereignty over the holy sites in
Jerusalem, and renouncement of Israeli control of Gaza, the West Bank, and Arab neighbor-
hoods in East Jerusalem (α = .76). Responses were made on Likert scales anchored at 1 (‘Not at
all’) and 7 (‘Very much so’).
Collective aggression. Individuals who blatantly dehumanize another group are more
willing to engage in collective aggression towards that group [10]. We examined support for
collective aggression using eight items. Sample items: “As long as Hamas continues to fire
rockets at Israel, I think it is justified to bomb Palestinian schools and hospitals”, “I support
hurting Palestinians in order to ‘teach them a lesson’” (α = .78). Participants responded on
Likert scales anchored at 1 (‘Strongly Disagree’) and 7 (‘Strongly Agree’).
Acceptance of civilian casualties. During wartime, blatant dehumanization of outgroup
is hypothesized to reduce concern over the welfare of outgroup civilians [29]. To assess accep-
tance of civilian casualties, we had participants respond to the following question: “Assume the
following scenario is taking place: An Israeli soldier is fighting with his combat unit in a neigh-
borhood in Gaza. He is shot and wounded by a Palestinian militant. In order to save him, one
of the other soldiers in the combat unit needs to fire a mortar shell back. However, this is a
dense urban neighborhood that contains Palestinian civilians. What is the maximum number
of Palestinian civilian casualties that you think is acceptable in order to save the soldier’s life?”
Participants were asked to choose the number of Palestinians casualties beyond which they
would no longer endorse the bombing, and were restricted to a number between 0 and 1,000.
Results
Descriptive statistics and variable inter-correlations can be found in Table 1. As expected,
Israelis perceived their own group as significantly higher in power relative to the Palestinians
(M = 83.99, SD = 24.27; one-sample t-test relative to the scale midpoint of 50: t(508) = 31.60,
p< .001; see Table 1).
Our central interest was in examining blatant dehumanization. On average, Israelis rated
Palestinians 39.81 points lower than their own group on the 0–100 Ascent scale. Strong blatant
dehumanization was clearly a normative response in this context: a full 50% of the sample indi-
cated a relative dehumanization score above 40, and 25% of the sample rated Palestinians over
69 points lower than their own group (see Table 1). Notably, by absolute rating Israelis
Symmetric dehumanization during asymmetric warfare
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regarded Palestinians (M = 41.21, SD = 32.46) as significantly closer to the quadrupedal
human ancestor than the ‘fully evolved’ modern human (i.e., 100) on the Ascent diagram, t
(510) = 6.13, p< .001.
Israelis’ hostile orientation towards Palestinians was also expressed across the outcome
measures: participants in our sample reported experiencing strong negative emotions towards
Palestinians, exhibited relatively low willingness to negotiate, low support for concession mak-
ing, high support for collective aggression, and strikingly high acceptance of civilian casualties.
On average, participants indicated that they would be willing to kill 575 Palestinian civilians in
order to save the life of one Israeli soldier wounded by a Palestinian militant. The median for
this measure in our sample was 990 Palestinians, and the modal response was the maximum
value allowed (i.e., 1000 Palestinians, selected by 49.9% of the sample).
We next examined the extent to which blatant dehumanization was associated with each of
these outcome measures, controlling for perceived group power, political ideology (SDO and
conservatism), and demographics (age, gender, and education) (see Table 2). In line with prior
work [30], [31] we found that conservatism significantly predicted all of the hostile outcome
measures, and SDO predicted 4 of the 7 outcomes (less hope, more emotional hostility, greater
collective aggression, and accepting a higher number of Palestinian civilian casualties). Despite
the strong predictive power of SDO and conservatism, blatant dehumanization was uniquely
associated with all of the outcome variables after controlling for these ideological variables,
subjective perceptions of power, and demographic variables. Excluding demographics did not
affect results here (or in Study 2), and results for all outcome measures were significant or mar-
ginally significant controlling for attribution of secondary emotions to Palestinians, with the
exception of group-based guilt.
Finally, we examined how variation in the level of Israelis’ subjective perceptions of the
power dynamics between their group and the Palestinians was associated with each of (a) bla-
tant dehumanization of Palestinians, and (b) the predictive utility of dehumanization. We
observed a weak positive correlation (see Table 1) such that Israelis who felt that their group
was more powerful were significantly more likely to blatantly dehumanize Palestinians. Using
the PROCESS macro ([32]; Model 1), we then examined whether subjective group power mod-
erated the association between blatant dehumanization and the various outcome measures
(controlling for all covariates). We observed little evidence consistent with this idea: although
Table 2. Simultaneous regressions predicting outgroup attitudes as a function of political ideology and dehumanization in Study 1.
Hope
R2 = .36
Hostile Emotions
R2 = .36
Group-Based Guilt
R2 = .29
Willingness to
Negotiate
R2 = .34
Concession
Making
R2 = .42
Collective
Aggression
R2 = .45
Acceptance of
Civilian
Casualties
R2 = .15
β 95% CI β 95% CI β 95% CI β 95% CI β 95% CI β 95% CI β 95% CI
Perceived Group Power .10* .02, .17 -.01 -.08, .07 -.05 -.13, .02 .01 -.06, .09 .00 -.07, .07 -.04 -.10, .03 -.01 -.10, .07
SDO -.15*** -.23, -.07 .10* .02, .18 -.07† -.16, .01 -.03 -.11, .05 -.04 -.12, .03 .20*** .13, .27 .14** .05, .23
Conservatism -.45*** -.53 -.37 .35*** .27, .43 -.45*** -.53, -.36 -.46*** -.54, -.38 -.52*** -.60, -.45 .40*** .33, .48 .24*** .15, .34
Age -.04 -.12, .03 -.02 -.09, .06 .01 -.07, .08 .14*** .06, .21 .01 -.06, .08 -.06 -.12, .01 .03 -.06, .12
Gender -.03 -.10, .04 .07 -.00, .14 -.06 -.13, .02 .02 -.06, .09 -.02 -.08, .05 -.03 -.10, .04 .02 -.06, .11
Education .03 -.05, .10 -.02 -.09, .06 -.04 -.11, .04 .02 -.06, .09 .05 -.03, .12 -.03 -.09, .04 -.05 -.13, .04
Blatant Dehumanization -.14*** -.22, -.06 .31*** .23, .39 -.10* -.18, -.02 -.14** -.22, -.06 -.20*** -.28, -.13 .24*** .17, .32 .12* .03, .21
*** p < .001
** p < .01
* p < .05
† p < .10
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181422.t002
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the negative association between blatant dehumanization and group-based guilt was stronger
among Israelis who felt more powerful (b = -.07, p = .04, 95% CI [-.15, -.00]), we observed no
significant interactions between subjective power and blatant dehumanization on hope (b =
-.04, p = .31, 95% CI [-.11, .03]), emotional hostility (b = .03, p = .34, 95% CI [-.04, .10]), will-
ingness to negotiate (b = -.01, p = .72, 95% CI [-.08, .06], concession making (b = -.01, p = .84,
95% CI [-.07, .06], collective aggression (b = .04, p = .20, 95% CI [-.02, .11], or collateral dam-
age (b = -.00, p = .99, 95% CI [-.08, .08].
Discussion
During the 2014 Gaza war, our sample of Israelis (members of the high power group) exp-
ressed extremely hostile attitudes towards Palestinians (members of the low power group),
including the highest levels of blatant dehumanization towards any outgroup observed to date
using the ‘Ascent of man’ measure of blatant dehumanization (i.e., higher than has been
observed among American, English and Hungarian participants rating over two dozen differ-
ent groups, including ISIS; [10], [33], [34]). Indeed, we found that Israelis rated Palestinians
closer to an animal on the scale than to a ‘fully evolved’ human. This blatant dehumanization
of Palestinians was also potent: even beyond subjective ratings of group power and ideological
variables known to be strongly associated with intergroup hostility in this context (i.e., SDO
and conservatism), dehumanization was uniquely associated with hostile attitudes likely to
perpetuate cycles of intergroup conflict [29], [33], including unwillingness to negotiate, collec-
tive aggression and endorsement of massive civilian casualties. Interestingly, although we
observed that the subjective perception of group power was weakly correlated with higher lev-
els of blatant dehumanization, the association between dehumanization and outcomes was
equally strong across levels of perceived power.
Although we expected that advantaged group members would blatantly dehumanize the
‘enemy’ during wartime, the degree of dehumanization, the vehemence of behavioral endorse-
ments (particularly the number of Palestinian civilians that Israelis were willing to kill in order
to save one Israeli soldier), and the association between dehumanization and outcomes beyond
ideological variables were striking.
We next considered our central question of interest: whether disadvantaged Palestinians
would similarly express blatant dehumanization towards Israelis in this same context, and if
so, whether this dehumanization would similarly predict intergroup hostility.
Study 2
According to the World Bank [35], Israel is a ‘high income developed country’, with one of the
world’s most advanced militaries. By contrast, with a GDP only 3% of Israel’s and no standing
army, Palestine is on par with ‘developing countries’ in the Middle East and North Africa. This
objective power asymmetry between Israelis and Palestinians is reflected by the subjective per-
ceptions of both Israelis and Palestinians, who were both found in prior work to perceive that
Israel is the more powerful group in the conflict [26].
Given prior research on system justification [12] and work suggesting consensual support
for hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies [11], it is possible that Palestinians might come to justify
elements of their disadvantaged position, including by being less likely to dehumanize their
more ‘developed’ and ‘sophisticated’ neighbor (see also [36], [37]). However, the amount of
destruction and civilian death experienced by the Palestinian community during the war in
Gaza prompted many Palestinians to focus on (what they perceived as) Israeli ‘brutality’ and
‘savagery’, animalistic traits associated with blatant dehumanization ([10], Study 5). Moreover,
research suggests that conflict and associated feelings of illegitimacy may decrease processes
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like system justification [12] and increase the potential for outgroup derogation [18] and dehu-
manization [38]. For these reasons, we predicted that despite their disadvantaged position,
Palestinians would express high levels of blatant dehumanization towards Israelis, providing
an important proof-of-principle for the idea that blatant dehumanization can prevail up (and
not just down) the power gradient.
Method
Research was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Northwestern University.
Participants. As with Study 1, we aimed to collect as large a sample as was feasible in
Study 2: We thus collected data from 354 Palestinian participants online in late August 2014
(i.e., during the Gaza war; M age = 27.11; SD = 8.90; 55.8% male). Participants were commu-
nity residents of the West Bank, recruited through a text-based employment agency (‘Souktel’).
Participants received a text message via cell phone and were given the opportunity to partici-
pate in the study online in return for phone credit. As with the Israeli sample, the Palestinian
sample was politically heterogeneous (see Table 3 for descriptive details), though it again
leaned somewhat conservative, with 61.7% reporting at least moderate levels of conservatism
(above 60 on the scale). Also similar to the Israeli sample, the Palestinian sample was generally
well educated, with 66.1% reporting that they had completed college. As with the Israeli partic-
ipants, Palestinians completed an omnibus survey of their political and social attitudes (see
supplementary materials for full survey).
Table 3. Descriptive statistics and variable intercorrelations for Study 2.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Perceived Group
Power
-
2. Social Dominance
Orientation
-.02 -
3. Conservatism -.23*** .07 -
4. Blatant
Dehumanization
-.27*** -.09 .28*** -
5. Trust .03 .12* -.16** -.27*** -
6. Hope -.03 .18** -.26*** -.32*** .65*** -
7. Group-Based Guilt -.02 .28*** -.21*** -.22*** .30*** .34*** -
8. Hostile Emotions -.21*** -.21*** .38*** .33*** -.40*** -.49*** -.38*** -
9. Parochial Empathy -.08 -.24*** .33*** .31*** -.44*** -.49*** -.47*** .54*** -
10. Willingness to
Negotiate
-.01 .04 -.13* -.25 .40*** .43*** .04 -.27*** -.13* -
11. Willingness to
Sacrifice Israeli Lives
-.15** -.03 .10 .12* -.10 -.12* -.11* .09 .19*** -.18**
-
M 60.68 30.62 71.41 37.03 31.61 23.86 15.00 70.60 73.94 45.37 46.76
SD 34.87 17.70 26.80 51.58 26.87 25.91 21.87 27.00 35.28 37.15 37.02
Quartiles 35.00,
69.00,
95.25
17.22,
31.50,
45.34
52.00,
76.00,
97.00
0.00,
35.50,
87.75
5.00,
28.50,
50.00
0, 15.00,
44.50
0, 3.00,
23.00
51.67,
70.00,
99.33
58.25,
93.50,
100.00
1.00,
48.50,
77.75
7.25,
47.00,
86.75
Note. Higher scores on perceived group power reflect a perception of Israel (i.e,. the outgroup) as more advantaged
*** p < .001
** p < .01
* p < .05
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181422.t003
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Measures. Although several of the constructs assessed in the Palestinian sample were
identical to those assessed in the Israeli sample, there were some differences for other variables,
particularly for some of the outcome measures. Due to the conflict’s asymmetry, direct parity
was not possible for some items. For example, Palestinians do not have the military capacity to
harm 1000 Israeli civilians, and we therefore adapted the item on acceptance of civilian casual-
ties to capture similar underlying psychological processes (the tradeoff between ingroup and
outgroup lives).
Age and gender. Participants indicated their age and gender (1 = male; 2 = female).
Education. Participants indicated whether they had: 1 = Completed primary education;
2 = Completed secondary education; 3 = Completed some college education; 4 = Completed
College; 5 = Completed graduate school.
Social dominance orientation. The dominance sub-dimension of SDO was assessed
using the same eight items as in Study 1, here on unmarked sliders anchored at 0 (‘Very much
disagree’) and 100 (‘Very much agree’) (α = .62).
Conservatism. Participants were asked to indicate their political ideology by characteriz-
ing their levels of political, religious, and social conservatism on unmarked sliders anchored at
0 (‘Liberal’) and 100 (‘Conservative’) (α = .91).
Perceived group power. We assessed subjective perceptions of group power as in Study 1,
here on unmarked sliders anchored at 0 (‘Definitely Palestinians’) and 100 (‘Definitely
Israelis’).
Blatant dehumanization. Blatant dehumanization was assessed with the Ascent measure,
as in Study 1. Here, participants were presented with the following target groups: Americans,
Europeans, East Asians, Palestinians, Israelis, Israeli settlers, and Israeli peace activists. As with
Study 1, we computed dehumanization by subtracting ratings of Israeli humanity from ratings
of Palestinian humanity. For mean dehumanization responses across all target groups, see S2
Table.
Trust. We reasoned that individuals who dehumanized the outgroup would also be less
likely to trust them, a key element promoting the likelihood of intergroup reconciliation [39].
We assessed trust of Israelis using three items: “I do not believe in the peaceful intentions of
Israelis” (reverse-scored), “I trust that Israelis want to find a solution that will bring peace
between Palestinians and Israelis”, and “If Israelis signed a political agreement, I trust that they
would honor that agreement” [39]. Responses were provided on unmarked sliders anchored at
0 (‘Completely disagree’) and 100 (‘Completely agree’). The first item was not correlated with
the remaining two items, from which we thus computed our composite measure (r = .33, p<
.001).
Group-based guilt. We assessed group-based guilt as in Study 1, here on unmarked slid-
ers anchored at 0 (‘Not at all’) and 100 (‘Very much so’) (r = .45, p< .001).
Emotional hostility. Hostile emotions were assessed as in Study 1, here on unmarked
sliders anchored at 0 (‘Not at all’) and 100 (‘Very much so’) (α = .77).
Hope. We assessed hope using three of the four items assessed in Study 1: “I have hope
regarding the peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”, “Under certain circum-
stances, and if all the core issues of the conflict are addressed, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
can be resolved”, and “I don’t ever expect to reach peace with the Israelis” (reverse-coded).
Responses were provided on unmarked sliders anchored at 0 (‘Completely Disagree’) and 100
(‘Completely Agree’). The third item was weakly correlated with the other two items, so we
computed our hope composite using the first two items (r = .50, p< .001).
Parochial empathy. Withholding empathy from the outgroup and reserving it for the
ingroup is an important contributor to cycles of intergroup conflict [40]. Blatant dehumaniza-
tion has previously been shown to negatively predict empathic responses to outgroup suffering
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[10]. We assessed parochial empathy [41] by asking participants: “How much compassion do
you feel for Palestinians who have suffered as a result of the conflict”, and “How much com-
passion do you feel for Israelis who have suffered as a result of the conflict”. Each of these
items was assessed on unmarked sliders anchored at 0 (‘None at all’) and 100 (‘A lot’), and
parochial empathy was computed as the difference in expressed compassion towards Palestin-
ian versus Israeli suffering.
Willingness to negotiate. We asked Palestinians to report their agreement with the fol-
lowing item: “How willing would you be for the Palestinians to enter direct negotiations with
Israel in order to reach a final settlement?” Participants responded on an unmarked slider
anchored at 0 (‘Not at all’) and 100 (‘Very much so’).
Willingness to sacrifice Israeli lives. Finally, we gave participants a version of the classic
trolley dilemma [42] in order to examine how morally permissible they thought it was to prior-
itize saving one Palestinian life over 4 Israeli child civilians. Subsequently, participants were
asked: “How morally permissible is it to save the 4 Israeli children and let the 1 Palestinian
man die?” Responses were provided on an unmarked slider anchored at 0 (‘Absolutely the
wrong thing to do’) and 100 (‘Absolutely the correct thing to do’), and then reverse scored
such that higher scores reflect greater moral acceptance of sacrificing Israeli lives.
Results
Descriptive statistics and variable inter-correlations can be found in Table 3.
As expected, Palestinians perceived their own group as significantly lower in power relative
to Israelis (M = 60.68, SD = 34.86; one-sample t-test relative to the scale midpoint: t(354) =
5.77, p< .001; see Table 3). Thus, our sample of Palestinian participants shared the Israelis’
view that Palestinians were the low-powered party in an asymmetric relationship with Israel.
Consistent with Study 1, Palestinian blatant dehumanization of Israelis (versus Palestinians)
was strong, with Israelis rated an average of 37.03 points lower than Palestinians on the Ascent
scale. Moreover, blatant dehumanization of Israelis was also normative in our sample: 50% of
participants rated Israelis over 35 points lower than Palestinians on the measure, and 25% of
the sample rated Israelis nearly 88 points lower (i.e., almost at ceiling; see Table 3). When we
examined absolute (rather than relative) ratings of Israelis on the Ascent scale, we observed
that our sample of Palestinians rated Israelis similar to how Israelis rated Palestinians: closer in
‘evolvedness’ to the quadrupedal primate than to the ‘fully evolved’ human on the Ascent dia-
gram (M = 45.03, SD = 39.25), t(353) = 2.38, p = .02.
Also similar to Study 1, we observed strikingly high levels of negativity and hostility: partici-
pants indicated low trust and hope, reported experiencing low group-based guilt, expressed
high levels of emotional hostility towards Israelis, and exhibited high levels of parochial empa-
thy. There was moderate support for negotiations, and a similarly moderate level of willingness
to sacrifice one Palestinian life to save four Israeli children.
We next examined the extent to which dehumanization was associated with hostile inter-
group attitudes and policy support. Following the same strategy as in Study 1, we performed
multiple regression analyses for each of the outcome measures using SDO, conservatism and
dehumanization as predictors, and controlling for perceived group power, age, gender and
education (see Table 4). Similar to Study 1, more conservative participants were less trusting,
less hopeful, less guilty, more emotionally hostile, expressed more parochial empathy, and
were less willing to negotiate. Consistent with prior work on SDO among disadvantaged
groups [43], [44], lower SDO (i.e., a greater desire for intergroup equality) was significantly
associated with more rejectionist attitudes with respect to the advantaged group: less hope and
guilt, more emotional hostility and parochial empathy. SDO was unassociated with willingness
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to negotiate, and neither of SDO or conservatism was associated with willingness to sacrifice
Israeli lives.
Most importantly for the current work, after controlling for power perceptions, ideology
and demographics, blatant dehumanization was significantly associated with all of the out-
come measures, with the exception of willingness to sacrifice Israeli lives. Specifically, Palesti-
nians expressing higher levels of blatant dehumanization exhibited significantly less trust and
hope, less guilt, more emotional hostility towards Israelis, more parochial empathy, and less
willingness to negotiate with Israel. Results for all outcome measures were consistent further
controlling for attribution of secondary emotions to Israelis (i.e., controlling for a subtle form
of dehumanization).
Finally, in a set of analyses complementary to Study 1, we examined the role of subjective
perceptions of group power on the dehumanization of Israelis. We observed that the more
Palestinians felt that they were disadvantaged relative to Israelis, the less they blatantly dehu-
manized Israelis (see Table 3). Said another way, the more powerful Palestinians felt, the more
they blatantly dehumanized Israelis (consistent with the link between subjective power percep-
tions and levels of dehumanization of Palestinians among Israelis). As in Study 1, we used the
PROCESS macro ([32], Model 1) to examine whether subjective perceptions of group power
moderated the association between blatant dehumanization of Israelis and the outcome mea-
sures (controlling for all other variables). We observed no evidence of moderation when we
examined trust of Israelis (b = -.04, p = .42, 95% CI [-.14, .06], hope (b = .01, p = .84, 95% CI
[-.08, .10], emotional hostility (b = .06, p = .19, 95% CI [-.03, .15], or parochial empathy (b =
-.00, p = .92, 95% CI [-.10, .09]). On the other hand, there were marginally significant interac-
tion effects on willingness to negotiate (b = -.09, p = .09, 95% CI [-.18, .01]) and willingness to
Table 4. Simultaneous regressions predicting outgroup attitudes as a function of political ideology and dehumanization in Study 2.
Trust
R2 = .10
Hope
R2 = .21
Group-Based
Guilt
R2 = .13
Hostile
Emotions
R2 = .27
Parochial
Compassion
R2 = .22
Willingness to
Negotiate
R2 = .11
Willingness to
Sacrifice Israeli
Lives
R2 = .10
β 95% CI Β 95% CI β 95% CI β 95% CI β 95% CI β 95% CI β 95% CI
Perceived Group
Power
-.05 -.17,
.06
-.17** -.27,
-.07
-.11† -.20,
.00
-.07 -.18,
.03
.02 -.08,
.12
-.13* -.24,
-.03
-.11* -.22,
-.00
SDO .09† -.02,
.20
.17** .07, .28 .25*** .14, .33 -.23*** -.34,
-.14
-.22*** -.32,
-.12
.06 -.04,
.17
-.02 -.13,
.09
Conservatism -.13* -.24
-.02
-.25*** -.36,
-.15
-.19** -.28,
-.08
.32*** .23, .44 .29*** .19, .39 -.13* -.24,
-.02
.06 -.05,
.18
Age -.02 -.13,
.08
.03 -.07,
.13
.02 -.08,
.11
.01 -.09,
.10
-.04 -.13,
.06
.06 -.05,
.16
-.03 -.14,
.07
Gender -.02 -.13,
.09
-.02 -.12,
.08
-.08 -.18,
.02
.06 -.04,
.15
.05 -.04,
.15
.05 -.06,
.15
.25*** .15, .36
Education -.07 -.18,
.04
-.11* -.21,
-.01
-.05 -.14,
.05
.02 -.08,
.12
.05 -.05,
.14
.06 -.05,
.16
-.06 -.17,
.05
Blatant
Dehumanization
-.23*** -.34,
-.12
-.28*** -.38,
-.17
-.13* -.23,
-.02
.20*** .10, .31 .21*** .11, .32 -.27*** -.38,
-.16
.06 -.05,
.17
Note. Higher scores on perceived group power reflect a perception of Israel (i.e,. the outgroup) as more advantaged.
*** p < .001
** p < .01
* p < .05
† p < .10
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181422.t004
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sacrifice Israeli lives (b = .09, p = .07, 95% CI [-.01, .19]), and a significant interaction on
group-based guilt (b = -.11, p = .02, 95% CI [-.20, -.01]. In all cases, the association between the
outcome measure and blatant dehumanization was stronger the more powerless Palestinians
perceived their group to be relative to Israelis.
Comparison between Israeli and Palestinian samples
The data from Studies 1 and 2 suggest that both Palestinians and Israelis perceive that the two
sides are involved in asymmetric conflict, and both agree that Israel as the more powerful
party. Even more importantly for our purposes, these data suggest that blatant dehumaniza-
tion, assessed in the context of ongoing conflict, is strong and consequential for both groups.
In a final analysis, we sought to formally assess whether blatant dehumanization was of similar
magnitude and consequentiality among our samples of these two groups.
We note that our samples of Israeli and Palestinian participants were not probability sam-
ples of the populations in each country, and thus the results cannot readily be generalized to
the populations at large. Nevertheless, the samples we obtained were comparable on a number
of levels. For example, each sample was balanced by gender (Israelis: 51.2% male; Palestinians:
55.8% male), included similar education levels (Israelis: 67.3% completed college; Palestinians:
66.1% completed college) and had similar political leanings (Israelis: 57.6% reported being at
least slightly conservative (‘slightly’, ‘moderately’, or ‘strongly’ conservative); Palestinians:
61.7% at least slightly conservative (above 60 on a continuous 100-point scale)). The Israeli
sample was approximately 10 years older, on average (Israelis: M age = 39.65, SD = 12.74;
Palestinians: M = 27.11, SD = 8.90), consistent with the difference in median ages between
these populations [45]. Given the overall similarity in the demographic features of our two
samples, we thought it reasonable to compare across them, while including age, gender, educa-
tion and conservatism as covariates in the analyses to account for any differences. Neverthe-
less, the caveat that the sample populations were not perfectly symmetrical should be kept in
mind.
We first assessed whether the two samples differed in their subjective perceptions of overall
group power with an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), controlling for conservatism, SDO,
and demographic variables (age, gender, education). We found that both Palestinians and
Israelis perceived Israel to be the more powerful side, but that Israelis perceived the power dis-
parity to be significantly greater, F (1, 830) = 66.17, p< .001, partial η2 = .07; we thus included
perceived power as a covariate in all subsequent analyses.
We next assessed overall levels of dehumanization across the two samples using an
ANCOVA, controlling for age, gender, education, conservatism, SDO, and subjective power
perceptions. We observed a significant but small difference in outgroup dehumanization
between Israelis and Palestinians, with Israelis showing slightly higher levels, F(1, 827) = 5.89,
p = .02, η2 = .007. Next, we examined the difference across samples in outcome measures
(again including the same set of control variables). Although some of the outcome measures
we examined were unique across contexts, four of the outcome measures were either identical
(i.e., group-based guilt; emotional hostility; the two hope items identical across samples) or
very similar in content (i.e., willingness to negotiate). For these outcome measures, we exam-
ined how endorsement differed as a function of group membership: we found that Palestinians
(versus Israelis) were more emotionally hostile (F(1, 828) = 14.77, p< .001, partial η2 = .02)
and less hopeful (F(1, 829) = 43.50, p< .001, η2 = .05), and yet were significantly more willing
to negotiate (F(1, 827) = 19.80, p< .001, η2 = .02). Palestinians and Israelis showed similar
(low) levels of group-based guilt (F< 1). Results were consistent when the covariates were not
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included, with the exception that the difference in blatant dehumanization between groups
was nonsignificant, F< 1.
Finally, we considered whether outgroup dehumanization functioned similarly for Israelis
and Palestinians–i.e., whether the predictive validity of blatant dehumanization was similar for
both groups. We first examined the relationship between blatant dehumanization and each of
the four outcome measures shared across both Israeli and Palestinian surveys using the PRO-
CESS macro ([32]; Model 1). We included age, sex, education, conservatism, SDO, and subjec-
tive power perceptions as covariates, and we controlled for the interaction terms between each
of these variables and group membership (thus, our analyses tested the significance of the dif-
ference in the strength of the relationships between dehumanization and the outcome variables
reported in Tables 2 and 4). These results revealed that dehumanization was similarly associ-
ated with the four outcomes that were measured similarly across both groups: for group-based
guilt, emotional hostility, and hope, the interaction term between dehumanization and group
membership did not significantly predict outcomes (group-based guilt: b = -.02, p = .74, 95%
CI: [-.15, .11]; emotional hostility: b = -.10, p = .11, 95% CI: [-.23, .02]; hope: b = -.11, p = .11,
95% CI: [-.24, .03]. There was a marginally significant interaction for willingness to negotiate
(b = -.13, p = .052, 95% CI: [-.27, .00]), suggesting that the association between blatant dehu-
manization and willingness to negotiate was somewhat stronger for Palestinians than for Israe-
lis (although it was significant for both groups).
When we conducted these same interaction analyses without the covariates included, we
obtained the same conclusions, with two exceptions: There was a significant interaction
between group membership and blatant dehumanization predicting hostile emotions, such
that the effects of blatant dehumanization were slightly stronger among Israelis compared to
Palestinians (though significant across both groups): b = -.14, p = .03, 95% CI [-.26, -.01], and
the interaction between group membership and blatant dehumanization on willingness to
negotiate was non-significant (b = .07, p = .26, 95% CI [-.06, .21].
Discussion
In sum, despite their disadvantaged status, Palestinians reported strikingly high levels of bla-
tant dehumanization of their more powerful Israeli neighbors. Indeed, we observed that the
participants in our Palestinian and Israeli samples dramatically dehumanized the outgroup,
rating them as closer to animals than full humans. Not only was the degree of outgroup dehu-
manization quite high among the advantaged and disadvantaged group, but it was also quite
potent: as with Israelis, Palestinians’ dehumanization of the outgroup was reliably and
uniquely associated with aggressive attitudes and support for aggressive policies likely to feed
cycles of intergroup violence.
Interestingly, although Palestinians feeling subjectively more powerless were somewhat less
likely to blatantly dehumanize Israelis, dehumanization of Israelis was just as strongly (or
more strongly) associated with the outcome variables among this group compared to Palesti-
nians who felt more powerful.
General discussion
Israeli and Palestinian participants surveyed during the 2014 Gaza war displayed extreme hos-
tility towards outgroup members, even outgroup civilians explicitly uninvolved in hostilities:
both groups reported highly negative outgroup-directed emotions, low concern for the other’s
suffering, low levels of hope, and high support for collective aggression and endorsement of
outgroup civilian casualties. These ratings were matched, among both groups, by strikingly
high levels of blatant dehumanization: our samples of Palestinians and Israelis rated the other
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group nearly 40 points lower in ‘evolvedness’ than the ingroup, rating the outgroup to be closer
to animals than full humans. Our results thus reflect both the dire realities of the Palestinian/
Israeli conflict, as well as the unsavory but important fact that blatantly dehumanizing entire
groups of people remains a feature of contemporary society [9], [46].
Beyond simply identifying high levels of intergroup hostility and dehumanization, our
work makes several important theoretical contributions. For one, we extend prior empirical
work on explicit blatant dehumanization conducted among advantaged group members [10]
by examining this construct among members of a disadvantaged group. Moreover, we extend
prior theorizing by specifically exploring how group power is associated with blatant outgroup
dehumanization in a context marked by regular conflict. Here, we explored the role of power
on blatant dehumanization in two ways: examining dehumanization as a function of member-
ship in an advantaged versus disadvantaged group, and as a function of variation in subjective
ratings of power among members of each group.
Our findings highlight a nuanced pattern of associations. On the one hand, we observed—
among both Israelis and Palestinians—that the more individuals subjectively perceived that
their group had power, the more likely they were to express blatant dehumanization of the
outgroup (r = .14 among Israelis; r = .27 among Palestinians). In this way, our findings are
consistent with earlier work that has suggested an association between feelings of power and
dehumanization [23]. At the same time, the associations between subjective power and dehu-
manization were relatively weak. Moreover, feeling subjectively less powerful did not tend to
affect the predictive utility of dehumanization: We found little evidence (among either group)
that subjective power perceptions moderated the association between blatant dehumanization
and our outcome measures (and indeed the only suggestive patterns indicated that blatant
dehumanization had more predictive utility among Palestinians who felt more powerless).
Indeed, our analyses examining group membership are consistent with the idea that (at
least in certain contexts) lacking power is not a decisive factor in determining the likelihood of
blatant outgroup dehumanization. Although both Palestinians and Israelis in our study subjec-
tively perceived Israel as the powerful group and Palestinians as the disempowered group,
average levels of outgroup dehumanization across both samples were very similar (and very
high). Furthermore, group membership did not significantly moderate the unique association
between blatant dehumanization and intergroup hostility. Thus, blatant dehumanization was
similarly associated among both groups with aggressive outcome variables (such as supporting
collective violence), controlling for demographics, subjective power perceptions, and variables
reflecting political ideology (i.e., SDO and conservatism).
Despite the contributions of our work, much remains to be understood. For one, although
we document symmetric patterns of blatant dehumanization among Israelis and Palestinians,
the reasons underlying this symmetry remain unclear. We think that one primary reason for
the patterns that we observed here is that blatant dehumanization in part reflects overt percep-
tions of savagery, brutality, and cold-heartedness ([10], Study 5; [16]). In highly asymmetric
violent conflicts, perceptions of savagery and barbarism may be a great equalizer: even if the
advantaged group is able to lay greater claim to features associated with full humanity such as
‘sophistication’ and ‘advancement’, they may still be heavily (and equally) dehumanized by the
disadvantaged group due to the perceived brutality of their actions. Whereas research on dehu-
manization of advantaged groups by disadvantaged groups has begun examining moderators
such as desires for assimilation [47] and power primes [48], we suggest that perceived brutality
also deserves further attention.
Although the primary purpose of this research was to examine blatant dehumanization
among members of a minority/disempowered group, we also compared the prevalence and
potency of blatant dehumanization across Israeli and Palestinian samples. For any cross-
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cultural comparison study, it is important to acknowledge the strengths and limitations of the
samples collected. A benefit of the samples presented here is that they were not limited to a
specific demographic (e.g., educated, liberals, men) [49]. Rather, our samples were relatively
large community samples that included approximately equal numbers of men and women;
each sample leaned slightly conservative, and represented a range of education levels, with
approximately one third from each sample lacking a college degree. The size and heterogeneity
of the samples gives us confidence that the results reported reflect the views of a wide range of
the Israeli and Palestinian populations.
Since the samples were comparable to each other, we opted to compare them directly in a
secondary analysis. However, the limitations of this analysis should be noted. First, there were
some minor differences between the surveys. For example, the reference groups included in
the dehumanization measure were different across samples, and the ideological covariates (i.e.,
SDO, conservatism) and outcome measures (willingness to negotiate) were assessed with a
7-point Likert scale for one group, and a continuous slider for the other (however, note that all
measures were z-scored to account for scale differences). Moreover, willingness to sacrifice
outgroup lives was assessed differently across groups, and willingness to negotiate was assessed
in Israelis towards the two main Palestinian political groups (‘Mahmoud Abbas’, the Palestin-
ian president who leads the Fatah political party, and ‘Hamas’, the other political party that
controls Gaza), whereas this item was assessed in Palestinians towards only one group (‘Israe-
lis’). Although this approach maintained ecological validity, it introduced slight differences
into the measures across samples. However, there is reason to believe that these small method-
ological differences had little effect on the main conclusions. Specifically, our previous research
has shown dehumanization judgments to be stable in American and Hungarian participants,
regardless of the other target groups included on the scale [10], or the type of scale used (i.e.,
continuous slider versus Likert scale). It also seems unlikely that the slight differences in our
measurement of willingness to negotiate dramatically impacted the main conclusions, particu-
larly given that the results for this outcome measure were similar to the results for outcomes
that were worded identically across groups. Nevertheless, future work comparing across sam-
ples could certainly opt to maximize similarity of the surveys, rather than ecological validity.
Second, although relatively large and diverse, the samples we collected were not national
probability samples, and thus they cannot be considered fully representative of the underlying
populations. Moreover, the mean age of the samples differed: the Israeli sample was approxi-
mately 10 years older than the Palestinian sample (however, note that this reflects the actual
difference in mean age between these populations). One way to mitigate this concern is to
account for the effects of age statistically, using them as covariates in the analyses. Here, we
controlled for age, gender, and education (as well as political conservatism) in all regression
analyses.
Finally, data from Palestinian sample was collected right as the war in Gaza was ending,
approximately 2 weeks after the Israeli sample was gathered. Although we think it unlikely that
negative perceptions would change markedly over this time, it is important to acknowledge
this difference.
To further increase confidence in our conclusions and examine their generalizability, future
work should re-examine blatant dehumanization among Israelis and Palestinians using repre-
sentative samples gathered simultaneously, and extend this work to a range of asymmetric
contexts, including those that do not involve violent conflict and war. Indeed, the conflictual
setting we examined is associated with perceptions of illegitimacy and competition over vic-
timhood status [50], both processes that might be expected to accentuate outgroup dehumani-
zation. In social contexts where the hierarchy is relatively stable and imbued with greater
legitimacy (e.g., the longstanding caste system in India), it is possible that disadvantaged
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groups (e.g., India’s Dalit, or ‘untouchables’) refrain from blatantly dehumanizing those at the
top, and perhaps even internalize their own dehumanized status. Finally, it is worth noting
that we conducted our study in the midst of a particularly ‘hot’ period (i.e., wartime) of a reli-
ably simmering conflict. Although examining blatant dehumanization amidst an active and
consequential intergroup conflict has important advantages, it would be interesting to com-
pare our results to times of relative peace (or ‘colder’ conflict) to concretely isolate the role of
active warfare.
Overall, this work adds substantial weight to the recent evidence for the importance of bla-
tant outgroup dehumanization, showing that it can take root not only among those groups
occupying the upper echelons of power and status but also among those at the bottom. Our
findings argue for the importance of continued research in this area. If, as UNESCO claims,
“wars begin in the minds of men [and women]”, it is critical that we understand how and why
individuals come to openly perceive their adversaries as animals unworthy of moral consider-
ation, so we can assess efforts employed to erode this imposing psychological edifice.
Supporting information
S1 Table. Mean blatant dehumanization among Israelis in Study 1, assessed using the
Ascent measure.
(DOCX)
S2 Table. Mean blatant dehumanization among Palestinians in Study 2, assessed using the
Ascent measure.
(DOCX)
S1 File. Full surveys.
(DOCX)
Author Contributions
Conceptualization: Emile Bruneau, Nour Kteily.
Data curation: Emile Bruneau.
Formal analysis: Emile Bruneau, Nour Kteily.
Funding acquisition: Emile Bruneau, Nour Kteily.
Investigation: Emile Bruneau.
Methodology: Emile Bruneau, Nour Kteily.
Project administration: Emile Bruneau, Nour Kteily.
Resources: Emile Bruneau, Nour Kteily.
Software: Emile Bruneau, Nour Kteily.
Supervision: Emile Bruneau, Nour Kteily.
Validation: Emile Bruneau, Nour Kteily.
Visualization: Emile Bruneau.
Writing – original draft: Emile Bruneau.
Writing – review & editing: Emile Bruneau, Nour Kteily.
Symmetric dehumanization during asymmetric warfare
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181422 July 26, 2017 17 / 20
References
1. Staub E. The roots of evil: The origins of genocide and other group violence: Cambridge University
Press; 1989.
2. Bandura A, Barbaranelli C, Caprara GV, & Pastorelli C. Mechanisms of moral disengagement in the
exercise of moral agency. Journal of personality and social psychology. 1996; 71(2), 364.
3. Kelman HG. Violence without moral restraint: Reflections on the dehumanization of victims and victimiz-
ers. Journal of social issues. 1973 Oct 1; 29(4):25–61.
4. Curtis L. Nothing but the same old story: The roots of anti-Irish racism: Information on Ireland; 1984
5. Smith DL. Less than human: Why we demean, enslave, and exterminate others: Macmillan; 2011.
6. Leyens J, Paladino PM, Rodriguez-Torres R, Vaes J, Demoulin S, Rodriguez-Perez A, et al. The emo-
tional side of prejudice: The attribution of secondary emotions to ingroups and outgroups. Personality
and Social Psychology Review. 2000; 4(2), 186–197.
7. Linde´n M, Bjo¨rklund F, Ba¨ckstro¨m M. What makes authoritarian and socially dominant people more
positive to using torture in the war on terrorism? Personality and Individual Differences. 2016; 91, 98–
101.
8. Pacilli MG, Roccato M, Pagliaro S, Russo S. From political opponents to enemies? The role of per-
ceived moral distance in the animalistic dehumanization of the political outgroup. Group Processes &
Intergroup Relations. 2016; 19(3), 360–373.
9. Kteily N, Bruneau E. Darker Demons of our Nature: The Need to (Re-) Focus Attention on Blatant
Forms of Dehumanization, Current Directions in Psychological Science. In Press.
10. Kteily N, Bruneau E, Waytz A, Cotterill S. The ascent of man: Theoretical and empirical evidence for bla-
tant dehumanization. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 2015; 109(5), 901. https://doi.org/
10.1037/pspp0000048 PMID: 26121523
11. Sidanius J, Pratto F. Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression: Cam-
bridge University Press; 2001.
12. Jost JT, Banaji MR., Nosek BA. A decade of system justification theory: Accumulated evidence of con-
scious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo. Political psychology. 2004; 25(6), 881–919.
13. Jost JT, Liviatan I, Van Der Toorn J., Ledgerwood A., Mandisodza A., & Nosek B. A. System justifica-
tion: A motivational process with implications for social conflict. In Justice and conflicts (pp. 315–327):
Springer; 2011.
14. Brandt M. Do the disadvantaged legitimize the social system? A large-scale test of the status–legiti-
macy hypothesis. Journal of personality and social psychology. 2013; 104(5), 765–785. https://doi.org/
10.1037/a0031751 PMID: 23421361
15. Fiske ST, Cuddy AJC, Glick P. Universal dimensions of social cognition: Warmth and competence.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 2007; 11, 77–83 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.005 PMID:
17188552
16. Haslam N. Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and social psychology review. 2006; 10
(3), 252–264. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_4 PMID: 16859440
17. Leidner B, Castano E, Ginges J. Dehumanization, retributive and restorative justice, and aggressive
versus diplomatic intergroup conflict resolution strategies. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin.
2013; 39(2), 181–192. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167212472208 PMID: 23386655
18. Brewer MB. The psychology of prejudice: Ingroup love and outgroup hate? Journal of Social Issues.
1999; 55(3), 429–444.
19. Jackson LE, Gaertner L. Mechanisms of moral disengagement and their differential use by right-wing
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation in support of war. Aggressive behavior. 2010; 36(4),
238–250. https://doi.org/10.1002/ab.20344 PMID: 20540162
20. Kteily N, Ho AK, Sidanius J. Hierarchy in the mind: The predictive power of social dominance orientation
across social contexts and domains. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 2012; 48(2), 543–
549.
21. Levin S, Sidanius J. Social dominance and social identity in the United States and Israel: Ingroup favorit-
ism or outgroup derogation?. Political Psychology. 1999 Mar 1; 20(1):99–126.
22. McFarland SG. On the eve of war: Authoritarianism, social dominance, and American students’ atti-
tudes toward attacking Iraq. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 2005; 31(3), 360–367. https://
doi.org/10.1177/0146167204271596 PMID: 15657451
23. Lammers J, Stapel DA. Power increases dehumanization. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations.
2011 Jan; 14(1):113–26.
Symmetric dehumanization during asymmetric warfare
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181422 July 26, 2017 18 / 20
24. Ho AK, Sidanius J, Kteily N, Sheehy-Skeffington J, Pratto F, Henkel K, Foels R, Stewart A. The nature
of social dominance orientation: Introducing the Social Dominance Orientation-7 Scale. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology. 2015 Dec; 109(6):1003–28. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000033
PMID: 26479362
25. Cohen-Chen S, Halperin E, Crisp RJ, Gross JJ. Hope in the Middle East malleability beliefs, hope, and
the willingness to compromise for peace. Social Psychological and Personality Science. 2013; 5(1) 67–
75.
26. Kteily N, Saguy T, Sidanius J, Taylor DM. Negotiating power: Agenda ordering and the willingness to
negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts. Journal of personality and social psychology. 2013 Dec;
105(6):978. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0034095 PMID: 23937644
27. Maoz I, McCauley C. Threat, dehumanization, and support for retaliatory aggressive policies in asym-
metric conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2008; 52(1), 93–116.
28. Halperin E, Russell AG, Trzesniewski KH, Gross JJ, Dweck CS. Promoting the Middle East peace pro-
cess by changing beliefs about group malleability. Science. 2011; 333(6050), 1767–1769. https://doi.
org/10.1126/science.1202925 PMID: 21868627
29. Bar-Tal D. From intractable conflict through conflict resolution to reconciliation: Psychological analysis.
Political Psychology. 2000; 351–365.
30. Hodson G, Hogg SM, MacInnis CC. The role of “dark personalities”(narcissism, Machiavellianism, psy-
chopathy), Big Five personality factors, and ideology in explaining prejudice. Journal of Research in
Personality. 2009; 43(4), 686–690.
31. Sibley CG, Duckitt J. Personality and prejudice: A meta-analysis and theoretical review. Personality and
Social Psychology Review. 2008; 12(3), 248–279. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868308319226 PMID:
18641385
32. Hayes AF. Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regression-based
approach: Guilford Press; 2013.
33. Kteily N, Hodson G, Bruneau E. They See Us as Less Than Human: Metadehumanization Predicts
Intergroup Conflict via Reciprocal Dehumanization. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.
2016; 110(3), 343–370. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000044 PMID: 26963763
34. Kteily N, Bruneau E. Backlash: The Politics and Real-World Consequences of Minority Group Dehu-
manization. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 2017; 43(1) 87–104.
35. The World Factbook. Retrieved. from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/
2177.html. Cited 8 July, 2017.
36. Iatridis T. (2013). Occupational status differences in attributions of uniquely human emotions. British
Journal of Social Psychology. 2013; 52(3), 431–449. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8309.2011.02094.
x PMID: 22353014
37. Vaes J, Paladino MP. The uniquely human content of stereotypes. Group Processes & Intergroup Rela-
tions, 13(1), 23–39.
38. Capozza D, Andrighetto L, Di Bernardo GA, Falvo R. Does status affect intergroup perceptions of
humanity? Group Processes & Intergroup Relations. 2012; 15(3), 363–377.
39. Nadler A, Liviatan I. Intergroup reconciliation: effects of adversary’s expressions of empathy, responsi-
bility, and recipients’ trust. Pers Soc Psychol Bull. 2006; 32(4), 459–470. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0146167205276431 PMID: 16513799
40. Cikara M, Bruneau EG, Saxe RR. Us and them intergroup failures of empathy. Current Directions in
Psychological Science. 2011; 20(3), 149–153.
41. Bruneau E, Cikara M, Saxe R. Parochial empathy predicts reduced altruism and the endorsement of
passive harm. Social Psychological and Personality Science. 2017; https://doi.org/10.1177/
1948550616663803
42. Thomson JJ. Double effect, triple effect and the trolley problem: Squaring the circle in looping cases.
Yale Law Journal. 1985; 94(6), 1395–1415.
43. Henry P, Sidanius J, Levin S, Pratto F. Social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, and support for
intergroup violence between the Middle East and America. Political Psychology. 2005 26(4), 569–583.
44. Levin S, Pratto F, Matthews M, Sidanius J, Kteily N. A dual process approach to understanding preju-
dice toward Americans in Lebanon: An extension to intergroup threat perceptions and emotions, Group
Processes & Intergroup Relations. 2013; 16(2) 139–158.
45. The World Factbook. Available from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
we.html. Cited 8 July, 2017.
46. Forscher PS, Cox WT, Graetz N, Devine PG. The motivation to express prejudice. Journal of personal-
ity and social psychology. 2015 Nov; 109(5):791. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000030 PMID: 26479365
Symmetric dehumanization during asymmetric warfare
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181422 July 26, 2017 19 / 20
47. Miranda M, Gouveia-Pereira M, Vaes J. When in Rome. . . Identification and acculturation strategies
among minority members moderate the dehumanisation of the majority outgroup. European Journal of
Social Psychology. 2014; 44(4), 327–336.
48. Miranda MP. On low-status groups: pervasiveness and boundaries of dehumanisation. 2014.
49. Henrich J, Heine SJ, Norenzayan A. Most people are not WEIRD. Nature. 2010; 466(7302), 29–29.
https://doi.org/10.1038/466029a PMID: 20595995
50. Noor M, Shnabel N, Halabi S, Nadler A. When suffering begets suffering the psychology of competitive
victimhood between adversarial groups in violent conflicts. Personality and Social Psychology Review.
2012; 16(4), 351–374. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868312440048 PMID: 22461010
Symmetric dehumanization during asymmetric warfare
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0181422 July 26, 2017 20 / 20
